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Appellant, Ted Jay Adamson, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Appeal Brief. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (h). The order appealed from is a 
final order disposing of all claims of all parties. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court commit an error of law in deciding it 
does not have jurisdiction and authority to modify the property 
award in the parties' Decree of Divorce? 
Did the trial court commit an error of law in failing to 
distinguish that the benefits Respondent is currently receiving 
are disability benefits and hence his separate property rather 
than retirement benefits awarded in the decree? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law 
rather than fact, the appellate court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions for correctness and to determine whether there has 
been an error of law, without according deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 751 P.2d 
248 (Utah Ct App. 1988); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The determinative statutory authority for this appeal is 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(3). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of Case 
This appeal is from a final order of the Second Judicial 
District Court, Honorable Jon M. Memmott granting the 
Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment on Respondent's Petition 
To Modify Decree of Divorce. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered by 
the Second District Court on November 30, 1992. On January 29, 
1998 Respondent filed a petition to modify the award of 
retirement benefits based upon Respondent's severe disability 
sustained subsequent to entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 
56(c) of Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure. 
3. Disposition in the Lower Court 
The court granted Petitioner's motion for summary judgment, 
ruling that, as a matter of law, Respondent was not entitled to 
modification of the Decree. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Second District Court on November 30, 1992. The 
Decree of Divorce was based upon a Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement signed by the parties. (Paragraph 1, 
Statement of Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To 
Motion For Summary Judgment). 
2. In the Decree the Petitioner was awarded a one-half 
(1/2) interest in Respondent's retirement benefits accrued during 
the marriage. (Paragraph 2, Statement of Facts of Respondent's 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment). 
3. At the time of the divorce, the Respondent was 42 years 
old and worked as a licensed plumber. (Paragraph 3, Statement of 
Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For 
Summary Judgment) 
4. At the time of the divorce, the Respondent did not 
contemplate drawing on his retirement pension fund until he 
retired at 62 years of age. (Paragraph 4, Statement of Facts of 
Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary 
Judgment) 
5. On May 1, 1995, Respondent, while working, fell two 
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stories onto cement and sustained a serious spinal cord injury. 
Respondent does not have the use of his legs and is confined to a 
wheel chair. The Respondent also has only limited use of his 
arms. The Respondent is no longer capable of employment and is no 
longer able to earn sufficient income to maintain his basic 
living expenses. (Paragraph 5, Statement of Facts of Respondent's 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment) 
6. In February, 1996, as a result of his disability, the 
Respondent qualified for early payments from his retirement and 
pension funds. He has been receiving $578.00 per month from the 
Utah Pipe Trades Pension Trust Fund and $610.00 per month from 
the Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund. These payments 
will be made to the Respondent for the rest of his life. The 
Respondent also is receiving Social Security disability payments. 
(Paragraph 6, Statements of Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In 
Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment) 
7. Had it not been for Respondent's unfortunate injuries, 
the Respondent would not have been eligible to receive retirement 
benefits from his retirement pension funds until he reached 62 
years of age. (Paragraph 7, Statement of Facts, Respondent's 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment) 
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8. Prior to the accident/ the Respondent was earning 
$3,000.00 to $4,000.00 per month. (Paragraph 8, Statement of 
Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For 
Summary Judgment) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary Judgment should be granted only when the evidence, 
considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The lower court granted Petitioner's motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law, it could not 
modify the property award to exclude Respondent's disability 
payments from distribution in the Decree of Divorce. Hence, 
Respondent never even got to the question of whether there had 
been a change of circumstance since entry of the decree. The 
trial court simply ruled it did not have authority. 
The applicable statute is clear that courts have continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes in divorce decrees for 
the distribution of property. Moreover, the benefits that the 
Respondent is currently receiving are disability benefits 
and as such are not marital property subject to distribution in 
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the decree. It is submitted that the lower court erred in 
granting Petitioner's motion for summary judgment and that as a 
matter of law, the lower court has continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the Decree of Divorce as requested by the Respondent. As 
such the case should be remanded for a determination on the 
threshold question as to whether there has been a substantial and 
material change of circumstance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BASIS FOR REVIEW 
Summary Judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). In the 
case at hand, the district court ruled that it did not, as a 
matter of law, have the authority to modify the property division 
in the decree, as requested by Respondent. The Respondent 
contends the district court does have continuing 
jurisdiction to modify property awards, to include the retirement 
annuity. 
6 
POINT II 
THE COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO MODIFY PROVISIONS IN A 
DECREE OF DIVORCE REGARDING DIVSION OF PROPERTY 
Case law, as well as state statute authorizes a court to 
modify property distributions. Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(3) provides 
as follows: 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health and dental care and for distribution of 
the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary, (emphasis added). 
A trial court may modify the division of property in a 
stipulated divorce decree under a showing of a substantial change 
of circumstances since entry of the decree and not contemplated 
in the decree itself Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct App 
1990); Williams v. Sherwood, 688 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1984); 
Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.d 181 (Utah 1981) (reallocation of 
property rights in installment payments of income from real 
property). 
In McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979), the 
Supreme Court stated the following 
Under Utah law, a trial court granting a Decree of 
Divorce is afforded considerable discretion in the area 
of property distribution . . . the court has continuing 
jurisdiction over the parties with regard to the 
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decree, enabling it to make subsequent modifications as 
are equitable. The breadth of discretionary power given 
the trial court in the initial determination of the 
property division extends in equal measure to these 
subsequent modifications. 
In other cases the Utah Supreme Court has stated that, while 
the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify property 
settlements, such should be resorted to with "great reluctance 
and for compelling reasons". Land v. Land 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 
(Utah 1980); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse supra at 61. 
In Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, the trial court modified the 
distribution of equity in the marital home and timing of pay out 
of a retirement program. 
In the present case, at the time of entry of the decree, the 
parties were contemplating that Petitioner would begin receiving 
her share of Respondent's retirement benefits only when the 
Respondent reached 62 years of age, the age when Respondent could 
begin receiving retirement benefits under his retirement plan. 
The parties did not contemplate any other circumstance wherein 
Respondent would begin receiving benefits from his retirement 
pension funds prior to Respondent reaching 62 years of age. The 
decree is silent on this issue. The Respondent's injuries 
subsequent to entry of the Decree were not contemplated by the 
decree. The Respondent's severe and debilitating injuries 
represent a substantial change in circumstances from the 
circumstances that existed at the time the decree was entered. In 
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addition, Respondent's injuries represent a compelling reason for 
the decree to be modified to provide for the circumstance that 
the parties now find themselves in. 
POINT III 
THE BENEFITS THAT THE RESPONDENT IS CURRENTLY RECEIVING ARE 
DISABILITY BENEFITS AND ARE NOT A MARTIAL ASSET SUBJECT TO 
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The appellate courts in many states have held that 
disability payments, intended to compensate the employee for lost 
earning capacity, are not marital property subject to equitable 
distribution between the parties in a divorce. Ciliberti v. 
Ciliberti, 374 Pa.Super. 228, 542 A. 2d 580 (Pa.1988); Allard v. 
Allard, 708 A. 2d 554 (Rhode Island 1998;; In Re Marriage of 
Stenquist, 21 Cal.3d 779, 148 Cal. Rptr, 9, 582 P.2d 96 (Ca. 
1978J; In Re Hoag, 122 Or. App 230, 857 P. 2d 208(Ore. 1993); 
Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 547, 521 A. 2d 370 (Md. 1987); Avallone 
v. Avallone, 275 NJ Super.575, 646 A. 2d 1121(N.J.1994); Freeman 
v. Freeman, 4 68 So.2d 32 6 (Fla.1985); Courts have been willing 
to look behind the labels of "retirement benefits" and 
"disability benefits" to determine the true nature of the 
benefits that are received by the recipient of the benefits. 
Ciliberti v. Ciliberti, supra, Allard v. Allard, supra; Avallone 
v. Avallone, supra. Retirement benefits are generally considered 
deferred compensation for past service, and are therefore 
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considered to be a marital asset subject to distribution upon 
dissolution of the marriage. Knies v. Knies, 979 P. 2d 482 
(Washington 1999). In contrast, disability benefits compensate 
for lost earnings resulting from a diminished capacity to compete 
in the employment market. Allard v. Allard, supra. "Disability 
benefits may serve multiple purposes. They may compensate for the 
loss of earnings resulting from compelled premature retirement 
and from a diminished ability to compete in the employment 
market. Disability benefits may also serve to compensate the 
disabled person for personal suffering caused by the disability." 
Ciliberti v. Ciliberti, supra, at 233, quoting In Re Marriage of 
Stenquist supra, at 101. 
As such, disability benefits are the injured party's sole 
property and are not subject to distribution upon the dissolution 
of the marriage. 
Losses incurred after entry of final divorce, including 
future loss of wages, future medical expenses and 
future loss of earning capacity are the injured 
spouse's separate property and not subject to equitable 
distribution upon dissolution of the parties marriage. 
Allard vs. Allardf supra. 
In this matter, payments received by the Respondent are in 
lieu of earnings that would have been paid to him if he had been 
able to work. Therefore, the payments received by the 
Respondent are disability payments, and as such are the 
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Respondent's separate property and are not subject to 
distribution to the Petitioner, 
In Avallone, supra the husband had vested rights in a 
retirement pension, but had not completed the necessary years of 
service. Therefore, his right to receive the retirement pension 
had not matured. The husband was eligible for retirement 
benefits when he reached fifty five years of age, but was only 
forty four years of age when he became disabled. The court 
ruled that payments to the husband were disability benefits, and 
thus were not subject to division with the wife. 
These facts are similar to the facts in this case. 
Respondent would have been eligible to receive retirement 
benefits twenty years after the disability occurred. Therefore, 
Respondent's rights to receive retirement benefits had not yet 
matured when the disability occurred. To allow the Petitioner 
to share in the Respondent's disability benefits provides an 
unexpected windfall for the Petitioner, and a financial hardship 
for the Respondent. 
Respondent is not seeking to divest the Petitioner of her 
share in Respondent's actual retirement benefits. Respondent 
agrees that the Petitioner should share in the retirement 
benefits as contemplated by the Decree, i.e., when the 
Respondent reaches 62 years of age, and would be eligible for 
retirement benefits according to the provisions of his 
11 
retirement plan. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in granting summary judgment to 
Petitioner. As a matter of law, Respondent's disability 
benefits are not a marital asset subject to distribution with 
Petitioner. Therefore Respondent is entitled to modify the 
Decree of Divorce to exclude Respondent's disability benefits 
from distribution in the decree of divorce. 
DATED this 29** day of June, 2000 
O^r 
Alan Rf Stuart 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that the BRIEF OF APPELLANT was sent via 
First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 29 day of June, 
2000 to the following counsel of record: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL LYNN ADAMSON, ] 
Plaintiff,
 l 
vs. 
TED JAY ADAMSON, ] 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENYING | DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OP DIVORCE 
| Civil No. 9247001125 DA 
* Judge Jon M. Memmott 
The hearing on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
denying defendant's petition for modification of decree of 
divorcer came on before the Honorable Jon M. Memmottf District 
Judge, on Tuesday the 24th day of August, 1999* Plaintiff 
appeared in person and by counsel, George K. Fadel* Defendant 
appeared in person and by counsel Alan R* Stewart- The Court 
having read the memoranda filed by the parties and hearing the 
arguments of counsel, and having heretofore made and entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and it appearing that 
Summary Judgment should be entered pursuant to Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the pleadings, decree and other 
information contained in the record show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, now therefor: 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
SEP 27 H i s i M 
I 
1. The QUADRO as amended is res judicata as to the 
entitlement of the parties to retirement benefits of the 
defendantf and the Court is without jurisdiction to modify the 
QUADRO as to the plaintiff's entitlement pursuant to the Decree 
of Divorce entered in this cause. 
2, Summary Judgment is hereby entered denying the 
defendant's motion to modify the decree of divorce* 
3» Ho costs are awarded either party. 
Dated this of September, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF .MAILING. 
I certify that on the 26th day of August, 1999, I mailed 
a copy of the Findings and Judgment relating no the petition for 
modification of .the decreel of divorce to Mr. Alan R* Stewart, 
attorney for the defendant-respondent,1366 East Murray-Holladay 
Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
